Abstract: Between 1988 and 1994 ten European countries introduced or modified their regulations on insider trading. We evaluate in this article the impact of such regulatory changes on the risk, return, and some other characteristics of these ten markets. After extensive testing, we find that the evidence suggests that these regulations have had little (if any) impact on the market characteristics we examine, and briefly speculate about the reasons that justify our findings.
I-INTRODUCTION
The academic discussion on the issue of insider trading and its regulation started in the mid-1960s with the pathbreaking book by Manne (1966) . Since then, a massive literature produced by lawyers, economists, and financial economists has addressed the theoretical impact of insider trading regulation (ITR) on securities markets.
1 This article intends to evaluate the empirical impact of ITR on European securities markets.
The empirical literature on insider trading has basically followed three approaches. The first approach consists of determining, using data self reported by insiders, whether insiders obtain abnormal returns; 2 see, for example, the seminal articles by Jaffe (1974) and Finnerty (1976) . The general consensus of this literature seems to be that insiders do obtain abnormal returns. To illustrate, Seyhun (1992) concludes that insiders obtained annual abnormal returns of 3. 5% before 1980, 5.1% between 1980 and 1984, and 7% after 1984 . This trend in insiders' abnormal returns is obviously at odds with the tightening of ITR observed in the U.S. during the 1980s. Thus, Seyhun (1992) concludes that the increase in statutory sanctions during that period did not have a detrimental impact on insiders' abnormal profits.
The second approach seeks to infer the presence of insiders from time series of stock returns. This approach basically consists of analyzing the behavior of stocks around some corporate announcement in order to determine abnormal patterns that may hint the presence of insiders; see, for example, Keown and Pinkerton (1981) analyzing merger announcements, and John and Lang (1991) analyzing dividend announcements. The consensus of this literature seems to be that stock prices do react before the public release of corporate announcements, and that they do it in a direction consistent with the presence of insiders in the market. 3 To illustrate, Keown and Pinkerton (1981) find that cumulative average abnormal returns become positive 25 days prior to a merger announcement date, and that approximately half of such increase occurs prior to that day. 4 Finally, a third and more novel approach consists of using information that makes it possible to identify exactly when insiders enter the market and what transactions they make, thus enabling researchers to analyze the impact of insider trading on the stocks considered. Meulbroek (1992) , using SEC nonpublic files, studies the transactions of 320 individuals charged with insider trading by the SEC; Cornell and Sirri (1992) , on the other hand, use court records to analyze the impact of insiders' transactions around the Anheuser-Busch's 1982 tender offer for Campbell-Taggart. To illustrate, Meulbroek (1992) finds that, in the days in which insiders made transactions, the mean abnormal return was 3.06% (and statistically significant), the cumulative abnormal return was 6.85% (and also statistically significant), and that in 81% of those days stock prices moved in the same direction as they subsequently did upon public announcement of the relevant events.
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Our purpose is neither to determine whether European insiders have obtained abnormal returns, nor to determine whether European insiders traded before corporate announcements, nor to evaluate the impact of the transactions of European insiders on selected stocks. Rather, our goal is to evaluate the impact of the regulations on insider trading imposed on ten European securities markets between 1988 and 1994.
To that purpose, we summarize the behavior of each market in an index of representative stocks and ask two questions: First, we ask what changes are observed in several characteristics of the returns series of each market after the imposition or tightening of ITR; then, we ask whether such changes (if any) have common features across the ten markets. Thus, if after controlling for factors affecting all markets, we observe that the markets in which ITR was imposed or tightened exhibit the same qualitative changes, we will conclude that those changes are likely to stem from the regulatory event. If, on the other hand, we observe no common pattern of change across markets, then we will conclude that the observed changes (if any) are likely to be due to idiosyncratic factors missing from the model rather than to the imposition or tightening of ITR.
Although we discuss our hypotheses in more detail below, we advance here that given the theoretical literature on the topic and the arguments typically advanced by regulators, the imposition or tightening of ITR should be expected to decrease stock returns and market efficiency, and increase volatility. However, we state from the outset that our null hypothesis is 5 This last result gives support to the argument that insider trading increases the informational efficiency of securities markets by correcting securities prices in the right direction. Such a result, informally suggested by Manne (1966) , has been formally established by Leland (1994) and Estrada (1995) , among others.
that of "no change." In other words, for reasons we explain in more detail below, we expect the regulatory events considered to have little (if any) impact on their respective markets.
Our study is different from previous empirical stud ies on insider trading in several aspects. First, most previous studies have been performed for U.S. markets; our study considers European markets. Second, most previous event studies on insider trading use corporate announcements as the events to be analyzed; the events we consider are the imposition or tightening of ITR. Third, most previous studies use data self-reported by insiders or data on individual stocks; our study uses aggregate data that summarizes in an index the behavior of each market. Fourth, as mentioned above, most previous studies focus either on determining whether insiders obtain abnormal returns, or on detecting the presence of insiders before corporate announcements, or on evaluating the impact of insider trading on selected stocks; our study seeks to evaluate the impact of ITR on several characteristics of the returns series of ten European securities markets.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. In part II, we describe the data and the basic methodology. In part III, we assess the impact of ITR on the distributions of (abnormal) returns and on the market models that generate these returns. In part IV, we estimate GARCH models in order to evaluate the impact of ITR on mean returns and volatility. And, finally, in part V, we summarize the most important conclusions and implications of our analysis. An appendix at the end of the article contains some tables and pictures, and a brief account of the evolution of ITR in the ten markets in our sample.
II-DATA AND METHODOLOGY
The sample under consideration consists of ten European securities markets that have either introduced or tightened ITR between 1988 and 1994; these markets are Austria (AUS), Belgium (BEL), Denmark (DEN), France (FRA), Germany (GER), Holland (HOL), Italy (ITA), Norway (NOR), Sweden (SWE), and Switzerland (SWI). The behavior of each of these markets is summarized by a Financial Times Actuaries Index, published daily in the Financial Times.
The sample size varies for each market; whenever possible, daily data has been gathered beginning approximately a year and a half before the imposition or tightening of ITR, and a year and a half after the regulatory event. The largest sample size is that of France (1,326 observations) and the smallest that of Germany (301 observations).
The regulatory events considered in this study are either the imposition or tightening of ITR. The former applies to those markets (such as Italy) that prohibited ITR for the first time.
The latter applies to those markets that had ITR but tightened it in the sense that insider trading became a criminal offense (Austria), that penalties were increased (Sweden), or that the scope of the offense was broadened (Norway). One regulatory event is considered in seven markets, and two regulatory events are considered in the other three markets. That yields a total of thirteen regulatory events, the earliest of which occurred in July of 1988 (in Switzerland), and the latest in August of 1994 (in Germany). Section A2 of the appendix contains a very brief account of the regulatory process in each of the markets in our sample. 6 Table 1 summarizes the dates of the regulatory events considered, the sample period for each market, and the number of observations in each sample and subsample. A comment about the event dates we consider is in order. It may be argued, based on a vast literature on event studies, that the events we should consider are not the dates in which ITR was imposed or tightened but the dates in which information about the regulatory change reached the market. Although we agree with the argument that, in general, the relevant date of an event is the date in which information about it becomes known, we believe the argument does not apply to the events we consider. The reason is the following.
Assume that in a country without ITR it becomes publicly known that, six months from today, a prohibition on insider trading will become effective. Why would an insider change his behavior today? Why not keep profiting from insider trading while it is legal and stop trading on inside information only when it becomes illegal? Why, on the other hand, would someone who feels deterred by the presence of insiders enter the market today? Knowing these outsiders that 6 An extensive review of American, European, and Japanese regulations on insider trading can be found in Gaillard (1992) . insiders will use their informational advantage for as long as they can, should not they wait to enter the market until insider trading actually becomes illegal?
It follows from the previous questions that, although insiders and outsiders may know today that ITR will be imposed within six months, neither has any incentive to change their behavior today. In fact, they both have an incentive to change their behavior only after ITR is effectively imposed. Therefore, a fully-anticipated imposition of ITR will not generate any reaction from market participants until such event actually takes place.
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In order to isolate the impact of ITR from the impact of other variables affecting all European markets, we use the standard methodology for event studies data developed by Brown and Warner (1985) . Thus, we estimate a market model of the form
where R it is the return on the ith market, R mt is the return on the European market, α i and β i are coefficients to be estimated, ε it is an error term, and the subscripts i and t index markets and time (trading days), respectively. 8 The coefficients α and β are estimated by OLS, and their standard errors are based on the Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent covariance matrix. 9 The return on the European-wide market is computed as an equallyweighted average of the returns of twelve European markets.
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The series analyzed for each market is the series of residuals ( $ ε it ), which are given by
Note that these residuals are excess (or abnormal) returns; therefore, throughout the article, we will refer to them as residuals, excess returns, abnormal returns, or simply as returns. In order to 7 To be sure, we do not suggest that there are investors who feel deterred by the presence of insiders; there is no empirical evidence to support that view. We only stress that, if insider trading deters some investors, only the actual imposition of ITR (and not its mere announcement) may encourage these investors to trade.
8 Returns for each market are defined as the first difference of the natural log of its index; that is, R t =[ln(I t )-ln(I t-1 )], where I t is the value of a Financial Times Actuaries Index on day t.
9 There exist other methods to estimate market models; see, for example, Scholes and Williams (1977) . However, as shown by Brown and Warner (1985) , these more sophisticated methods do not produce significant improvements over OLS. See, also, Lo and MacKinlay (1990) . 10 The reason we use an equally-weighted index (instead of the more widely-used cap-weighted index) is that we want to give the same importance (weight) to the regulatory events in every country. Had we used a capweighted index, a regulatory event in England would be much more important (that is, it would have a much larger impact on the index) than one in Austria.
assess the impact of ITR on mean returns and volatility, we will estimate GARCH models in part IV. But we address before the impact of ITR on the temporal behavior and the distribution of abnormal returns, and on the market models that generate these returns, immediately below. 
III-MARKET MODELS AND ABNORMAL RETURNS

1) Abnormal Returns
The aggregate impact of ITR on the ten markets in the sample can be assessed by analyzing the pattern of abnormal returns before and after the imposition or tightening of this regulation. To that effect, we focus on the first regulatory event in each country, thus analyzing the impact of ten events. In order to avoid event-driven biases, we first estimate the coefficients α ι and β ι using data for the first 200 trading days before the regulatory event.
12 Then, for each of the 200 trading days around the event (100 days before and 100 days after), we compute the daily average abnormal return (AAR), which is given by
where N t is the number of markets with returns available on trading day t. We also compute the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) between two trading days t 1 and t 2 ; this CAAR is given by
11 Throughout the article, conclusions from all tests are drawn at the 5% significance level.
12 Except for Germany, in which case the market model is estimated with 149 observations.
If the aggregate impact of ITR on the ten securities markets in the sample were nil, then both the AARs and the CAARs would fluctuate randomly over time. Figures upward trend in the CAARs, it should be remembered that random walks usually appear to display patterns when in fact none is present. In other words, more formal testing is called for.
We test the significance of abnormal returns using four statistics, two for AARs and two
for CAARs. For the former, we compute the standard t-test and a sign (or runs) test; for the latter, we compute Brown and Warner's (1985) ratio of the CAAR to its estimated standard error with autocorrelation adjustments, and Corrado's (1989) nonparametric rank test. These statistics,
computed not only for a period of 200 days around the regulatory events but for several other periods as well, are shown in Table 2 . Brown and Warner (1985) ; the C-ratio corresponds to equation (8) in Corrado (1989) .
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The results in Table 2 are consistent across all procedures and point in the same direction, namely, to the fact that the introduction or tightening of ITR had no aggregate impact on the behavior of the ten European securities markets in our sample. The p-values of the sign test clearly cannot reject the null hypothesis that positive and negative AARs are randomly distributed, thus implying the absence of any pattern in the AARs. The p-values of both tests on the CAARs, on the other hand, clearly cannot reject the hypothesis that the CAARs are not significant in any of the time intervals for which AARs were estimated. Therefore, the evidence presented in this section gives us a first suggestion that the imposition or tightening of ITR did not have a significant impact on European securities markets.
2) Changes in Market Models
The analysis of abnormal returns is based on the premise that, if the market model has changed after the regulatory event, the model estimated with data prior to the event will not fit the data well after the event. This poor fit, in turn, will generate large residuals, thus yielding significant AARs and CAARs. The analysis of abnormal returns thus addresses the issue of the aggregate impact of ITR (that is the impact of ITR by considering all the markets in the sample at once) rather than the impact of ITR on any given market. We thus move to address whether the imposition or tightening of ITR has caused a change in the intercept or the slope of each individual market model.
A particularly interesting hypothesis to test is whether the slope of each market model decreased after the introduction or tightening of ITR. This is due to the fact that one of the traditional arguments for imposing this regulation is that it presumably increases investors' confidence in the market, thus decreasing the cost of capital of all firms; see, for example, Brudney (1979) . In our context, a market's beta (the slope of the market model) is directly related to the cost of capital of the firms in that market.
14 Therefore, if this argument holds, we would expect to observe a significant decrease in the slope of the market models after the regulatory events.
Preliminary evidence on the impact of the introduction or tightening of ITR on each of the ten markets in our sample can be obtained by inspecting the changes in the intercept and the slope of the market models estimated before and after the regulatory events. Those estimates are shown in Table A1 , in section A1 of the appendix. However, in order to formally test for changes in the intercept or the slope of the market models, we add to these models dummy variables representing the regulatory events. Thus, the augmented market models are given by
where ITR1 and ITR2 are two dummy variables such that ITR1=1 after the first regulatory event (and ITR1=0 before it), ITR2=1 after the second regulatory event (and ITR2=0 before it), and the 14 A firm's weighted-average cost of capital (R WACC ) is given by
where R D and R E are the firm's required return on debt and equity, respectively, x D and x E are the firm's proportions of debt and equity, respectively, and t c is the corporate tax rate. The firm's return on equity, in turn, is given by an asset pricing model, typically the CAPM. Thus, R E , and, therefore, R WACC are a positive (linear) function of the firm's beta.
αs and βs are coefficients to be estimated. Relevant results for these augmented market models for each of the ten markets in the sample are shown in Table 3 .
TABLE 3: Augmented Market Models
Augmented Market Model: , and ITR2=1 after the second regulatory event (and ITR2=0 before it). Significance based on the Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent covariance matrix. Table 3 shows that the introduction or tightening of ITR did not have a significant impact in the intercept of any of the market models. More important, however, is the impact of the regulatory events on the slope of the market models for, as argued above, a decrease in the slope of a given market model would imply a lower cost of capital for the firms in that market.
In terms of signs, Table 3 shows that the impact of the regulatory events is mixed; the slope of the market models decreases after six out of the thirteen events considered, and increases after the other seven. More importantly, these changes are significant in only four cases; after the events in Austria, Holland, and the second event in Norway, the slope of the market model decreases; after the first event in Norway, the slope increases. Therefore, the data gives little support to the argument that ITR decreases the cost of capital of firms. In fact, the few significant changes found are more likely to be due to factors missing from the market models rather than to the introduction or tightening of ITR.
The impact of ITR on the intercept and the slope of each market model is also important to determine whether the series of residuals for each market should be generated by one market model estimated for the whole sample, or by market models estimated for each subsample. If individual and joint tests of significance fail to reject the hypothesis of no change in the coefficients of a market model after the regulatory event (or events), then one market model can be estimated for the whole sample. This market model would then generate the series of residuals for that market. If, however, these tests reject the hypothesis of no change in the coefficients, then one market model would have to be estimated for each subsample, and each market model would then generate the residuals for each subsample.
Tests of significance for individual coefficients are shown in Table 3 and were discussed above; joint tests of significance are shown in Table A2 , in section A1 of the appendix. These joint tests show that the market model has changed after only three out of the thirteen events considered; these changes have occurred after the regulatory event in Holland, and after each of the two regulatory events in Norway. Therefore, two market models are estimated for Holland (one before and one after the regulatory event), three market models are estimated for Norway (one before the first regulatory event, one between events, and one after the second event), and one market model for the rest of the markets in the sample. Note that in the case of Austria, the t-test on the slope of the market model implies that a significant change occurred after the regulatory event, but the joint test in Table A2 implies that the market model itself did not change. Given this contradictory evidence, residuals for Austria are estimated both from one market model for the whole sample period, and from two market models (one for each subsample). 15 The market models used to generate the residuals to be used in the remainder of this study are reported in Table A3 , in section A1 of the appendix.
3) Changes in Mean Returns and Volatility
Several relevant characteristics of the distribution of returns generated by the market models reported in Table A3 are reported in Table A4 , in section A1 of the appendix. This table may be useful to evaluate some preliminary evidence on the impact of ITR on the mean returns and volatility of European securities markets.
For the reasons stated above related to investors' confidence in the market and the cost of capital of firms, betas should be expected to decrease after the imposition or tightening of ITR. It thus follows from this argument that investors should lower their required return on equity and, in equilibrium, realized stock returns should decrease. Stock price volatility, on the other hand, should increase after the imposition or tightening of ITR. This is basically due to the fact that this regulation decreases the flow of information to the market, thus magnifying price jumps when information does finally arrive; see Estrada (1995) . Therefore, we would expect to find l ower returns and higher volatility after the introduction of the regulatory events we consider. Table A4 reports that mean returns decreased after five of the thirteen events considered (the events in Austria, Denmark, and Sweden, the first event in Belgium, and the second event in
Norway), and increased after the other eight events. Hence, there does not seem to be a pattern 15 All results to be reported for Austria correspond to the series of residuals generated by two market models. These results are virtually identical to those for the series of residuals generated by one market model for the whole sample.
in the reaction of mean returns to the imposition or tightening of ITR. In addition, it should be clear that the sign of these changes says nothing about whether these changes have been significant, an issue that will be formally addressed below.
A similar comparison can be made in terms of volatility. Table A4 shows that volatility has increased after five of the thirteen regulatory events considered (the events in Denmark and
Italy, the first events in Belgium and Norway, and the second event in France), and decreased after the other eight events. Hence, there does not seem to be a clear pattern in the reaction of volatility to the imposition or tightening of ITR. Further, it is also the case here that the sign of these changes says nothing about whether these changes have been significant, an issue that will be formally addressed below. 
4) Changes in Linear and Nonlinear Dependence in Stock Returns
Our goal in this section is to briefly explore whether the introduction or tightening of ITR has had any impact on some aspects of market efficiency, particularly in the pattern of linear and nonlinear dependence in stock returns. To that effect, we compute Ljung-Box Qstatistics for 6, 18, and 30 lags in returns (to test for linear dependence) and squared returns (to test for nonlinear dependence). These statistics are reported in Table A5 , in section A1 of the appendix.
It is widely acknowledged that ITR decreases the informational efficiency of securities markets; see, for example, Manne (1966) , Leland (1992) , Meulbroek (1992) , and Estrada (1995). We would therefore expect linear and nonlinear dependence in stock returns to increase after the imposition or tightening of this regulation. In order to briefly address this issue, we focus on the Q-statistics for 6 lags in returns; in addition, we focus only on significant changes.
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Such changes occur after six out of the thirteen regulatory events considered. In three cases (after the events in Denmark, Germany, and Italy), the pattern of linear dependence increases significantly, and in the other three cases (after the event in Sweden and the first events in Belgium and Norway), the pattern of linear dependence decreases significantly. These results could be interpreted as saying that, after the regulatory events, the market becomes more efficient (less predictable) in Belgium, Norway, and Sweden, and less efficient (more 16 The standard tests for differences in means and variances assume that the two samples under consideration are independent, an assumption that is not likely to hold in our context. Thus, we have chosen not to perform those tests.
predictable) in Denmark, Germany, and Italy. Table A6 , in section A1 of the appendix, reports the first six autocorrelations of returns for all markets before and after the regulatory events.
In order to briefly address the issue of nonlinear dependence, we focus on the degree of volatility clustering in stock returns; that is, the tendency of large (small) changes in returns to be followed by large (small) changes in returns. To address this issue, we focus on the Q-statistics for 6 lags in squared returns (Q 2 ), and on those cases in which a significant change (as defined above) occurs. Such changes occur after six out of the thirteen regulatory events considered. In three cases (the second event in Belgium, the first event in Norway, and the event in Sweden), the pattern of volatility clustering disappears after the regulatory event, and in the other three cases (the events in Austria and Germany, and the second event in Norway), a pattern of volatility clustering emerges after the regulatory event.
In sum, the reaction of linear and nonlinear dependence in stock returns to the imposition or tightening of ITR does not seem to display a clear pattern. In fact, no significant reaction in linear and nonlinear dependence is observed after more that 50% of the regulatory events considered; and in those cases in which the reaction is significant, it fails to be uniform across markets. Therefore, as argued above, these changes are more likely to be due to factors missing from the market models rather than to the impact of ITR.
IV-MEAN RETURNS AND VOLATILITY
The preliminary conclusions reached in the previous part about the impact of ITR on returns and volatility can be more formally assessed within a time-series model of stock returns.
Beginning with the pathbreaking article by Mandelbrot (1963) , a vast amount of evidence has shown that stock returns exhibit a tendency for volatility clustering. Engle (1982) pioneered a way to model volatility clustering with the introduction of the ARCH model; that is, a model of time-varying conditional variances. Several authors subsequently proposed modifications of this model, notably Bollerslev (1986) with the GARCH model, Engle, Lillien, and Robbins (1987) with the ARCH-M model, and Nelson (1991) 
where ITR1 and ITR2 are two dummy variables that account for the introduction of the first and second regulatory events, respectively, 18 and the γs, δs, and λs are coefficients to be estimated.
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As in Akgiray (1989) , among several others, we assume that u t I t-1 , and, therefore, R t I t-1 , are normally distributed with mean 0 and variance h t .
Note that the coefficients γ 1 and γ 2 measure the impact of the first and second regulatory events, respectively, on the mean returns of each market. Note, further, that the coefficients γ 3 and γ 4 measure the impact of the first and second regulatory events, respectively, on the volatility of each market. As stated above, if ITR increases confidence in the market, betas should decrease and (in equilibrium) stock returns should decrease. Furthermore, according to Estrada (1995) , ITR decreases the flow of information to the market and increases the jumps in returns when information arrives, thus causing volatility to decrease. Hence, we would expect the coefficients γ 1 and γ 2 in (7) to be negative, and γ 3 and γ 4 in (8) to be positive.
The joint estimation of the conditional mean and the conditional variance of returns for each market is achieved in two steps: First, the most appropriate model for mean returns is selected; then, the selected process for the mean is jointly re-estimated with a GARCH (1,1) process for the variance, after adding the dummy variables that represent the regulatory events in both equations. The most appropriate process to model mean returns is selected by using the Schwarz criterium (SC); the competing models evaluated are the AR(1), AR(2), MA(1), MA(2), and ARMA(1,1). Not surprisingly, the mean returns of most series can be appropriately modeled with an AR(1) or an MA(1). 20 In fact, the SC selects a different process in only one case (Germany), for which the best model is an MA(2). The maximum likelihood estimates of the selected mean equations for each of the ten markets in the sample are reported in Table 4 . In terms of signs, Table 4 shows that mean returns have decreased (γ 1 <0 or γ 2 <0) after four events (those in Austria, Denmark, and Sweden, and the second event in Norway), and increased (γ 1 >0 or γ 2 >0) after the other nine events. More important, however, is the fact that none of these coefficients is significant; that is, the evidence shows that the imposition or tightening of ITR did not have any significant impact on the mean returns of any of the markets in the sample.
The maximum likelihood estimates of the GARCH(1,1) process for the variance of stock returns for each of the ten markets in the sample are reported in Table 5 . In these equations, the impact of the first and second regulatory events on volatility can be assessed through the coefficients γ 3 and γ 4 , respectively. In terms of signs, the evidence is again mixed. Volatility increased (γ 3 >0 or γ 4 >0) after five out of the thirteen regulatory events considered (the events in Denmark and Italy, the first events in Belgium and Norway, and the second event in France), and decreased (γ 3 <0 or γ 4 <0) after the other eight events. However, the cha nge in volatility is significant after only six out of the thirteen events considered. More precisely, volatility increased significantly after the event in
Denmark and the first events in Belgium and Norway, and decreased significantly after the event in Austria, the first event in France, and the second event in Norway. Therefore, the evidence shows that the changes in volatility observed after the regulatory events considered are not significant in more than half of cases; and that when significant changes were observed, no clear pattern in the changes emerges. Hence, the observed significant changes in volatility may simply be due to the impact of factors missing from the model rather than to the impact of ITR.
V-CONCLUSIONS
During the last thirty years, a vast literature has considered the issue of insider trading and has evaluated the theoretical benefits and costs of regulating this activity. In this article, we have attempted to evaluate the empirical impact of ITR by focusing on the regulations imposed between 1988 and 1994 on ten European securities markets.
Most of the evidence analyzed in this article points in the same direction; that is, to the fact that ITR has had little, if any, impact on the securities markets analyzed. The finding of a low deterrence effect of ITR seems to be in line with that found by Seyhun (1992) in the U.S.
The analysis of abnormal returns failed to detect an aggregate impact of ITR when considering all the markets in the sample at once. Individual and joint tests of significance on the market models, on the other hand, detected significant changes after the regulatory events in very few cases. In particular, the argument that ITR decreases the cost of capital of the firms in the market seems to be seriously at odds with the evidence. And very few significant changes in the pattern of linear and nonlinear dependence in stock returns occurred after the regulatory events.
The results of the GARCH models estimated to test the impact of ITR on mean returns and volatility were also consistent with the previous results. In particular, the evidence showed that the imposition or tightening of ITR did not have a significant impact on mean returns in any of the markets in the sample. The evidence also showed that over 50% of the regulatory events considered did not have a significant impact on volatility, and that in those cases in which a significant change in volatility occurred after the events, no clear pattern in the reaction of volatility emerged. Therefore, as argued above, we are inclined to think that the significant changes we detected in the market models, in the pattern of linear and nonlinear dependence, and in volatility are more likely to be due to the impact of factors missing from the estimated models rather than to the impact of ITR.
A logical extension of our line of investigation is to address the issues we tackle in this paper at the firm level, using several firms for each of the markets we consider in this article.
The firm selection process may be tricky (due to the fact that ITR may have a different impact on different firms) but the micro data should reflect more accurately the impact of the regulatory changes we consider.
We prefer not to draw hard conclusions about the reasons for which investors in European securities markets have virtually ignored insider trading restrictions. The issue of enforcement, however, immediately comes to mind. Directive 89/592/EEC, issued by the Council of the European Communities on November 13, 1989, provided that member states were to regulate insider trading (according to the guidelines given in the Directive) before June 1, 1992. However, the Directive did not create a central agency with the purpose of enforcing compliance; it merely provided that member states were to designate authorities responsible for the proper application of the insider trading prohibitions, and that these authorities were to be granted the necessary supervisory and investigative powers.
Casual empiricism suggests that very few resources are allocated in European markets to detect the presence of insiders. Although we have no hard data to back this hypothesis, scattered evidence (for example, the extremely low number of indictments) seems to point in that direction. It is thus natural to wonder why monitoring is so lax. After all, does it make sense to waste resources in discussing and writing a regulation that is later going to be virtually ignored?
One reason behind the lack of enforcement may be that insider trading is not considered so harmful in Europe as it is in the United States. In many European countries, notably in Germany, insider trading is considered as a part of doing business; see, for example, Standen (1995) . It may be the case that European countries finally capitulated to the demands of the SEC and decided to impose ITR, but not being fully convinced that imposing ITR was appropriate for European securities markets, they decided to put very little effort in enforcing this regulation.
We cannot back this speculation with hard data. But we can certainly argue, with the evidence we do have, that European markets have barely reacted to the restrictions on insider trading imposed in recent years. Number of observations. First rows show estimates for the period before the first regulatory event, second rows for the period after the first regulatory event (or between events in markets with two events), and third rows for the period after the second regulatory event. Significance based on the Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent covariance matrix. and s are the ith sample moment and the sample standard deviation of the distribution, respectively; both coefficients computed with a finite-sample adjustment. SSkw=Standardized skewness and SKrt=Standardized kurtosis. First rows show estimates for the period before the first regulatory event, second rows for the period after the first regulatory event (or between events in markets with two events), and third rows for the period after the second regulatory event. indicate the kth autocorrelation and its asymptotic standard error, respectively. First rows show estimates for the period before the first regulatory event, second rows for the period after the first regulatory event (or between events in markets with two events), and third rows for the period after the second regulatory event.
APPENDIX A1-FIGURES AND TABLES
-
A2-EUROPEAN INSIDER TRADING REGULATIONS
We present in this section a very brief summary of the evolution of ITR in the ten European markets considered in this article. The dates of the events we consider are in italics. Denmark. Until 1987, the pricing of and trading in securities listed in the Copenhagen Stock Exchange was addressed only by recommendations issued by the Exchange. The Rules of Ethics adopted by the Exchange in 1979 were only guidelines; violations of these guidelines could not be sanctioned. The Danish Stock Exchange Act was enacted on January 1, 1987; insider trading was prohibited by Section 39 of this Act. In mid-1990, the Minister of Industrial Affairs formed a commission with the task, among others, of adapting ITR to the EC Directive and making insider trading a criminal offense. The commission's proposed amendments to section 39 of the Act (a new Chapter 11) were enacted on June 6, 1991, and came into effect on August 1, 1991.
Austria
France. Insider trading was first made ille gal in France on December 23, 1970, through Article 10-1 of the Ordinance that just over three years before had created the French Securities and Exchange Commission (Commission des Opérations de Bourse, COB), on September 28, 1967. Subsequent modifications of the 1967 Ordinance on January 3, 1983 , and January 22, 1988 (effective January 24, 1990 , broadened the scope of the offense and increased its penalties. The later modification, in particular, significantly increased the COB's investigative power. On August 2, 1989, the COB was given the authority to impose administrative sanctions for violations of its own regulations; as a response, on July 17, 1990, the COB promulgated Regulation 90-08 specifically directed against insider trading; this regulation came into effect on January 21, 1990 . Thus, there are two sets of rules that apply to insider trading in France: the 1967 Ordinance and its amendments, and the COB Regulation 90-08.
Germany. In November of 1970, the Voluntary Insider Trading Guidelines and the Broker and Investment Advisor Rules were put into effect; they were later revised in 1971, 1976, and 1988 . The Guidelines were voluntary and adherence was based upon contract. Most corporations required senior management and potential insiders to enter into contracts with the corporation assenting adherence to these Guidelines and the Code of Procedure. Regulations that made insider trading a criminal offense were finally implemented on August 1, 1994.
Italy. The first Italian law specifically addressing insider trading (Law 153) was enacted on May 17, 1991, and came into force on May 21, 1991. Until then, no regulation in Italian law prohibited insider trading, although attempts had been made to apply regulations conceived for other purposes to insider trading. Law 153 satisfies the requirements of the EC Directive.
Holland. Insider trading has been prohibited in Holland since February 16, 1989 , day in which Article 336a of the Dutch Criminal Code came into force. However, as early as 1973, the Commit tee on Corporate Law set up by the Minister of Justice had already recommended penalties for insider trading. The Dutch criminal provisions were put into effect before the publication of the EC Directive; they satisfy the Directive fully, and, in some respects, they go even further.
Norway. The first Norwegian regulations on insider trading were contained in Act 61 of June 14, 1985 on Securities Trading, which came into effect on October 15, 1985. This Act was later amended (adding sections 6a and 6b) by Act 75 of November 8, 1991. Sections 6a and 6b came into effect on February 10, 1992, and other parts of section 6 on March 1, 1993.
Sweden. In the early 1970s, insiders in listed companies were required to disclose the holdings (and changes in holdings) i n their companies, but the legislation contained no sanctions for insider offenses. In the mid-1980s specific criminal sanctions were introduced for insider trading offenses through the Securities Market Act (SFS 1985:571) , which came into effect on October 1, 1985. After a complete reevaluation of securities markets regulations, the Insider Act (SFS 1990 (SFS :1342 ) was adopted and came into effect on February 1, 1991. This new act broadened the definition of insiders, extended the prohibition to all kinds of instruments in the securities markets, and increased the severity of the sanctions.
Switzerland. On November 16, 1981, in the case St. Joe Mineral v. BSI, the federal district court of the Southern District of New York subjected a Swiss bank to a significant daily fine for as long as it refused to reveal information to the SEC about the name of a client for whom transactions had been made in the American stock market. This ruling provided incentives, already under way, to enact regulations against insider trading. On August 31, 1982, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed between Switzerland and the US concerning collaboration in matters of mutual legal assistance. Convinced of the need for action, the Swiss congress decided to focus on insider trading. A bill was approved on December 18, 1987, and a new MOU was signed with the US on November 17, 1987. Insider trading was finally prohibited in Switzerland on July 1, 1988, day in which Article 161 of the Swiss Penal Code came into effect. Under this Article, insider trading is a criminal offense.
